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The court affirmed for two reasons; that the allegation did not
specify wherein the negligence consisted, 1 and, as plaintiff had offered
no proof to substantiate the allegation, he could not proffer an efficacious
appeal because "an appeal ex necessitate follows the theory of the
trial. 1 2

Hence, plaintiff had no basis for an appeal."3

This latter reason alone would be sufficient to defeat plaintiff, and
the reason that the allegation is too general was not necessary, yet, it
was powerfully stated. Consequently, it seems probable that the court
inserted it to serve notice on future pleaders that a general allegation
3f negligence is an insufficient pleading of a cause of action.
In the future, the Davis case will probably be limited to its facts
and North Carolina will probably require specific allegations of negligence. It should be noted, however, that the Fleming case made no
mention of the Davis case, and the latter was decided on demurrer
while the former was not. Even so, cautious pleaders of negligence
should make specific allegations of the manner in which the defendant
was negligent.
RicHAD L. GriFFin.
Pleadings-Overruling of Demurrer for Misjoinder of Parties
and Causes--Effect of Reversal on Appeal
The question was recently presented' as to whether an action was
still pending after the North Carolina Supreme Court had reversed the
lower court's judgment 2 overruling a demurrer for misjoinder of parties
and causes of action.3
After the first opinion was certified down, but before the lower
court had acted in accordance therewith,4 plaintiffs moved for leave to
file an amended complaint. 5 When the motion came before him, the
resident judge concluded that the Supreme Court had sustained the
"1The complaint did set out a cause of action on another theory of negligence.
"Fleming v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 232 N. C. 457, 463, 61 S. E. 2d
364, 3369
(1950).
Coral
Gables, Inc. v. Ayres, 208 N. C. 426, 181 S. E. 263 (1935) ; Edgerton
v. Perkins, 200 N. C. 650, 158 S. E. 197 (1931).
1
Teague v. Siler City Oil Co., 232 N. C.469, 61 S. E. 2d 345 (1950).
' Teague v. Sler City Oil Co., 232 N. C. 65, 59 S. E.2d 2 (1950).
1N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-123 (1943) determines what causes of action may be
joined. For a thorough discussion of joinder of parties and causes, see Brandis,
Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N. C. L. REV. 1,
16 ( 1946).
1See MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CML CASES
§694 (1929) for the disposition of a case on appeal.

1N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-163 (1943) allows amendments in the discretion of the
court. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-131 (1943) which gives the right to move for leave

to amend when a demurrer is sustained, has no application to cases in which the

action has been dismissed for misjoinder of parties and causes. Grady v. Warren,
202 N. C. 638, 163 S.E. 679 (1932).
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diemurrer and that this had the legal effect of dismissing the action.
Hence he denied the motion for want of authority. 6 The basis of the
decision appealed from seems to lie in the often repeated rule that a
demurrer must be sustained and the action dismissed when there is a
misjoinder of parties and causes. 7 There can be no division of the
action to eliminate the misjoinder, and after the demurrer has been
sustained and the action dismissed, an amendment will not be allowed.9
On appeal from the refusal to hear the motion, the Supreme Court,
while recognizing the dismissal rule, stated that the effect of its order
reversing the judgment of the lower court overruling the demurrer was
not to sustain the demurrer, but was an order to the lower court to
do so. As the order did not expressly dismiss the action, it was pending and open to motion until the lower court rendered final judgment.
The Supreme Court has the discretion to enter final judgment or to
allow the lower court to do so upon receipt of its opinion.1 0 In previous
cases where the appeal was from an order overruling a demurrer for
misjoinder of parties and causes, the Supreme Court has rarely dismissed the action upon reversing. 1' Likewise, it has not often expressly
6 No appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the exercise of a discretionary
power of the superior court in the absence of palpable abuse. But if the exercise
of its discretion is refused upon the ground that it has no power to grant a
motion addressed to its discretion the ruling of that court is reviewable. Hooper
v. Glenn, 230 N. C. 571, 53 S. E. 2d 843 (1949) ; Gilchrist v. Kitchen, 86 N. C.
20 (1882).
Beam v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. 2d 270 (1942); Wingler v. Miller,
221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. 2d 247 (1942); Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C. 336, 7
S. E. 2d 706 (1940) ; Smith v. Land Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481 (1938) ;
Town of Wilkesboro v. Jordon, 212 N. C. 197, 193 S. E. 155 (1937); Atkins v.
Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935); Carswell v. Whisenant, 203 N. C.
624, 166 S. E. 793 (1932); Sasser v. Bullard, 199 N. C. 562, 155 S. E. 248
(1930) ; Citizens Nat. Bank of Baltimore v. Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C. 576, 137
S. E. 705 (1927) ; Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C.
107, 108 S. E. 389 (1921); Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97, 65
S. E. 750 (1909); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299, 41
S. E. 484 (1902).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-132 (1943), which provides for division of actions after
a demurrer has been sustained for misjoinder of causes of action, does not apply
when there is also a misjoinder of parties. Moore County v. Burns, 224 N. C.
700, 32 S. E. 2d 225 (1944); Southern Mills, Inc. v. Summit Yarn Co., 223
N. C. 479, 27 S. E. 2d 289 (1943); Rose v. Fremont Warehouse and Improvement Co., 182 N. C. 107, 108 S. E. 389 (1921) ; Roberts v. Utility Mfg. Co., 181
N. C. 204, 106 S. E. 664 (1921) ; Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97,
65 S. E. 750 (1909); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299,
41 S. E. 484 (1902); State ex rel. Cromartie v. Parker, 121 N. C. 198, 28 S. E.
297 (1897); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887).
' Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
" It is not the practice to render final judgment in the Supreme Court unless
it is necessary to protect some right of the litigant parties in danger of ad interim
defeat, or where it is demanded by public convenience or welfare. Ordinarily,
the opinion of the court is certified down to the superior court of the county
from which the appeal came, where a judgment in accordance with the opinion
Mcis entered. Goodson v. Lehmon, 225 N. C. 514, 35 S. E. 2d 623 (1945).
INTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES §694(6)

(1929).

" Southern Mills, Inc. v. Summit Yarn Co., 223 N. C. 479, 27 S. E. 2d 289
(1943); Town of Wilkesboro v. Jordon, 212 N. C. 197, 193 S. E. 155 (1937).
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remanded the action with directions for further proceedings. 12 Ordinarily, upon finding that the lower court erred in not sustaining the
demurrer, it has repeated the dismissal rule and simply reversed, giving
no clear indication whether an amendment to the pleadings could or
could not thereafter be allowed. 13
That the action remains open for motion seems to be a desirable
decision. Plaintiffs are given opportunity to cure a defect which is
otherwise fatal, 14 thus allowing the action to continue, to be decided on
its merits. 15 While -dismissal for "dual misjoinder" is ordinarily without prejudice, and plaintiffs may begin a new action or actions,16 there
is some advantage to plaintiffs in avoiding dismissal. By being allowed
to continue, plaintiffs are able to avoid paying the costs in the original
action, 1 7 and save the time and expense involved in starting a new
action.
The question was raised but was not decided in the present opinion
as to the effect of affirming a judgment which sustained a demurrer for
" dual misjoinder." In such case, authority seems to indicate that the
action is no longer pending and open to motion for leave to amend.,'
If the order which sustained also dismissed, it is clear that no cause
1 Beam v. Wright, 222 N. C. 174, 22 S. E. 2d 270 (1942) ; Shore v. Holt, 185
N. 1'
C.Foot
312, v.
117Davis
S. E.Co.,
165 230
(1923);
Tuck,
84 311
N. C.
605 (1881).
N. C.Street
422, 53v. S.
E. 2d
(1949)
; Moore County v.
Bums, 224 N. C. 700, 32 S. E. 2d 225 (1944); Burleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C.
336, 7 S. E. 2d 706 (1940) ; Smith v. Land Bank, 213 N. C. 343, 196 S. E. 481
(1938); Atkins v. Steed, 208 N. C. 245, 179 S. E. 889 (1935); Williams v.
Gooch, 206 N. C. 330, 173 S. E. 342 (1934) ; Citizens Nat. Bank of Baltimore v.
Angelo Brothers, 193 N. C. 576, 137 S. E. 705 (1927) ; Rogers v. Rogers, 192 N. C.

50, 133 S. E. 184 (1926) ; Roberts v. Utility Mfg. Co., 181 N. C. 204, 106 S. E.
664 (1921); Morton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 130 N. C. 299, 41 S. E.

484 (1902).

" See note 7 supra.
"It is the policy of the code system to be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings so that causes may be tried upon their merits. See Page v. McDonald,
159 N. C. 38, 41, 74 S. E. 642, 643 (1912) ; Cheatham v. Crews, 81 N. C. 343,
345 (1879) ; Bullard v. Johnson, 65 N. C. 436, 438 (1871).
SBurleson v. Burleson, 217 N. C. 336, 7 S. E. 2d 706 (1940); Weaver v.

Kirby, 186 N. C. 387, 119 S. E. 564 (1923). N. C. GEN. STAr. §1-25 (1943),
which allows a new action to be brought within one year after nonsuit, reversal,

or arrest of judgment, if the original suit was commenced within the time prescribed therefor, applies to the new action. Blades v. Southern Ry., 218 N. C.
702, 12 S. E. 2d 553 (1940).
" A new action may be brought under N. C. Gmai. STAT. §1-25 (1943) only
if the costs in the original action have been paid by the plaintiff prior thereto,
unless the original suit was brought in forma pauperis.
" Wingler v. Miller, 221 N. C. 137, 19 S. E. 2d 247 (1942) held that the order
sustaining a demurrer to cross actions for misjoinder of parties and causes worked
a dismissal of the cross actions. It was, therefore, improper to sustain the demurrer and at the same time retain the cross actions for amendment. As pointed
out in the principal case, "the asserted cross actions were not pleadable in that
action so that an amendment could not serve to remedy the defect." Furthermore, an answer rather than a complaint was involved. However, it is doubtful
that these possible distinctions detract from the authority of Wingler v. Miller,

supra, as setting forth a rule of general application. The opinion in the case
clearly dealt with the problem just as if it had been presented by a complaint.
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is pending after the order is affirmed.10 In a few cases, after affirming
a judgment sustaining a demurrer, the court has remanded the case to
allow an amendment. 2 These cases are exceptions to the dismissal
rule.2'
An awkward situation now exists. Assuming that a complaint contains a misjoinder of parties and causes, the principal case holds that
if the lower court overrules a demurrer, and the judgment is reversed
on appeal, plaintiffs have opportunity to move for leave to amend until
the time final judgment is entered in the superior court. But if the
lower court sustains the demurrer and dismisses the action, and the
judgment is affirmed on appeal, plaintiffs have no chance to cure the
defect as no action is pending 2 2 The same result is probable when the
order merely sustains the demurrer. Thus the rights of the parties are
materially affected by the opinion of the trial judge as to what constitutes -a misjoinder of parties and causes. That is, if an appeal is
taken in each case, a proper sustaining of the demurrer is to the advantage of the defendants, while an erroneous order overruling the
demurrer works to the obvious advantage of the plaintiffs. If this
discrepancy is to be regretted, it must be noticed that nothing short
of abrogating the dismissal rule or overruling the present decision is
likely to cure it.
The decision in the present case is a liberal one. In allowing plaintiffs the opportunity to eliminate the objectionable features after the
Supreme Court has found a misjoinder of parties and causes, it is a
recognition that it is feasible to allow severance of the causes, rather than
23
to require dismissal of the action, upon the sustaining of a demurrer.
However, in view of its long standing, it can hardly be said that an
indication has been given that the dismissal rule will be changed.
STEPHEN P. MILLIKIN.
, Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
"0
Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. 133, 34 S. E. 246 (1899); Mitchell v. Mitchell,
96 N. C. 14, 1 S. E. 648 (1887); Logan v. Wallis, 76 N. C. 416 (1877). In
Robertson v. Robertson, 215 N. C. 562, 2 S. E. Zd 552 (1939) the court dismissed
only as to the parties causing misjoinder.
" See Brandis, Perissive $oinder of Parties and Cause.0 in North Carolina,
25 N. C. L. REv. 1, 50 (1946).
2 Grady v. Warren, 202 N. C. 638, 163 S. E. 679 (1932).
23 The court has allowed the misjoinder defect to be eliminated after a demurrer was interposed, but before a decision -was made sustaining it. Sparks v.
Sparks, 230 N. C. 715, 55 S. E. 2d 477 (1949); Walker v. Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey, 222 N. C. 607, 24 S. E. 2d 254 (1943) ; Campbell v. Washington Light

and Power Co., 166 N. C. 488, 82 S. E. 842 (1914).

